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Power grid vulnerability: A complex network approach
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10129 Torino, Italy
2Dipartimento di Fisica, Politecnico di Torino, Corso Duca degli Abruzzi 24, 10129 Torino, Italy
Received 2 December 2008; accepted 12 January 2009; published online 20 February 2009
Power grids exhibit patterns of reaction to outages similar to complex networks. Blackout se-
quences follow power laws, as complex systems operating near a critical point. Here, the tolerance
of electric power grids to both accidental and malicious outages is analyzed in the framework of
complex network theory. In particular, the quantity known as efficiency is modified by introducing
a new concept of distance between nodes. As a result, a new parameter called net-ability is pro-
posed to evaluate the performance of power grids. A comparison between efficiency and net-ability
is provided by estimating the vulnerability of sample networks, in terms of both the metrics.
© 2009 American Institute of Physics. DOI: 10.1063/1.3077229
Technological infrastructures are of vital importance for
contemporary societies. As a consequence of the world
wide growing interconnections, the security of networks
such as world-wide-web, transport, power systems, is be-
coming a priority in the agenda of policy-makers, indus-
trial and academic researchers. In recent years several
blackouts occurring in USA and Europe have drawn a lot
of attention to security problems in electric power trans-
mission systems. In these scenarios, it is convenient to go
beyond the traditional deterministic bottom-up descrip-
tion in favor of a statistical top-down approach. Also the
specific area of power systems has attracted the physicists
community interested in the applications of complex net-
work theory. In this paper, we investigate the topological
structure and resilience of power grids by adopting a
complex network description. We notice that the geodesic
distance, used in complex network metrics, can be gener-
alized to account for the flow capacity between nodes.
Based on this new concept of distance, a metric called
net-ability is introduced to estimate the performance and
resilience of power networks upon line removal.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern states and societies can only function if the nec-
essary infrastructures are continuously available and fully
operative. Critical infrastructures are organizations or facili-
ties of key importance to public interest whose failure or
impairment could result in detrimental supply shortages, sub-
stantial disturbance to public order or economic impact. The
theory of complex networks is increasingly being exploited
to tackle those sorts of issues. For a comprehensive review
on complex networks we refer to Ref. 1. Examples of appli-
cations include facilities for electricity generation, transmis-
sion and distribution, oil and gas production, telecommuni-
cation, water supply, agriculture food production and
distribution, public health hospital, ambulances, transpor-
tation systems fuel supply, railways, airports, harbors, fi-
nancial and security services.2–20 Due to their importance, a
crucial issue is learning how to improve the tolerance of
critical infrastructure to failures and attacks. A line of re-
search investigating issues of flow and transportation in com-
plex networks is under active development.21–30 A major
threat for the proper functioning of power networks is that of
large blackouts that may involve big cities or even portions
of states. Traditionally such occurrences were caused by ac-
cidental faults and thus were quite rare; however, in recent
years, power systems, as well as other critical infrastructures,
have become a potential target for intentional attacks. The
main difference is that malicious attacks may not be random
but rather directed specifically to the most sensitive parts of
the system, in terms of the impact they can cause. Thus, most
of the applications of complex network concepts to power
systems are aimed at understanding the behavior of power
grids both in case of accidental failures and of malicious
attacks.31–44
The tolerance of a network to failures is normally in-
tended as the ability of the network to maintain its connec-
tivity properties after the deletion of a fraction of its nodes or
lines. In this way the problem can be mapped into a standard
percolation problem, of the type extensively studied in sta-
tistical physics.45,46 However, a pure connectivity approach,
which may be suitable, for instance, in the case of the World
Wide Web, does not seem to catch most of the crucial fea-
tures of a power network. In general a power network can
indeed undergo severe damages even without any inverse
percolation taking place; on the contrary, it can happen that
some less important nodes become isolated, thus changing
the connectivity of the network, without strongly affecting its
global performance.
A parameter introduced to evaluate the tolerance of com-
plex networks to outages is the efficiency.47 In the present
paper we further develop this concept and propose a new
parameter to evaluate the performance of a power grid,
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which we name net-ability. The new definition takes into
account some peculiar features of electrical networks, such
as, the flow limits and the power flow allocation through the
network, due to the inherent physical laws.
The paper is structured as follows: In Sec. II we review
the definition of efficiency pointing out its meaning in rela-
tion to power grids. In Sec. III we introduce the definition of
net-ability. In Sec. IV we provide examples of the applica-
tion of net-ability to evaluate the static tolerance to outages
of a few sample networks. Comparison between efficiency
and net-ability is finally provided. General conclusions and
comments are provided in Sec. V. Finally, in the Appendix
we recall some basic notions about power systems analysis
used in the paper.
II. EFFICIENCY AND VULNERABILITY
As a preliminary step, let us briefly recall the definition
of geodesic distance commonly used in the literature on
complex networks. Let us start considering an unweighted
graph: the number of lines in a path connecting nodes i and
j is called the length of the path. A geodesic path or shortest
path between i and j is the path connecting these nodes with
minimum length. The length of the geodesic path is the geo-
desic distance dij between i and j. If one is dealing with a
weighted graph, the length of a path is the sum of the
weights of the lines constituting that path.
The global efficiency E of a network was first introduced
by Latora and Marchiori47 as follows:
E =
1
NN − 1ij
1
dij
, 1
where N is the number of nodes of the network and dij is the
geodesic distance between the nodes i and j; the sum is taken
over all pairs of nodes of the network. The global efficiency
is a measure of the performance of the network, under the
assumption that the efficiency for sending information be-
tween two nodes i and j is proportional to the reciprocal of
their distance.
In many networks it happens that some nodes and lines
are more important than others. While naively one would say
that the most important nodes are those with the highest
degree,48 for large networks it is often nontrivial to find out
which are the components that are actually most critical for
the performance of the network. Since the efficiency has
been associated with the performance of the network, a natu-
ral way to find critical components of a network is by look-
ing for the nodes or lines whose removal causes the biggest
drops in efficiency. The vulnerability VEl of a line l can be
defined as the drop in the performance when the line l is
removed from the network,49
VEl =
E − El
E
, 2
where E is the global efficiency of the network and El is the
global efficiency after the removal of the line l. When a node
is removed, all the lines attached to the node are removed as
well.
A definition of network vulnerability is the maximum
vulnerability of all its nodes,50
V = max
l
Vl . 3
The general definition of vulnerability, Eq. 2, as a drop
in the efficiency can be usefully applied also to power net-
works. However, when applied to power grids, some prob-
lems arise with the definition of efficiency given by Eq. 1.
Specifically, the efficiency defined by Eq. 1 shows
three main problems when applied to power grids:
1 In electrical circuits power does not flow from a node i
to another node j along a single specific path for in-
stance, the geodesic path, but rather along all the paths
connecting i to j according to the power flow; see the
Appendix for a simplified method to solve the power
flow equations. Therefore the classical idea of geodesic
distance is not suited for power grids and a different
concept of distance needs to be introduced.
2 In Eq. 1 the sum is taken over all pair of nodes. How-
ever in electrical circuits power flows only from genera-
tion to load nodes, so only distances between generator-
load pairs should be taken into account.
3 For each pair i , j of generation and load nodes, the
network has a different transfer capability Cij in trans-
mitting power. Suppose we increase the power injection
at node i until the first line reaches its line flow limit; Cij
is equal to the power injection in that moment.
III. FROM EFFICIENCY TO NET-ABILITY
In the same spirit of the efficiency described in the pre-
vious section, the net-ability of a power transmission grid is
defined as a measure of its performance under normal oper-
ating conditions. The function of a power transmission net-
work is to transmit a time dependent amount of power from
generation nodes to load nodes in the most convenient tech-
nical and economic way. The economic issues are related to
transmission costs and economic efficiency social surplus
of the underlying market, while the technical issues refer to
losses, voltage drop, and stability. The actual ability of a
power transmission grid to perform properly depends on its
topological structure and on the impedance and flow limits of
its lines.
The concept of distance dij may be explained as the dif-
ficulty to transfer the relevant quantity between the nodes
i , j of a network. Distance in general depends on the path
that one follows and thus should be defined as a function of
the characteristics of the lines along the path. The economic
and technical difficulties for transmission of electrical power
through a path depend on both the power flow through the
lines and on their impedance: with the same impedance,
higher power flow increases costs; with the same power flow,
higher impedance increases costs. Consequently, the distance
from node i to node j along path k is related not only to the
impedance of each line of the path but also to the power
flows through the lines of the path. As a result, we define the
electrical distance as
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dij
k
= 
lk
fkl Zl, 4
where fkl is the power transmission distribution factor of line
l in path k and Zl its impedance see Eq. A9 for details.
On account of Eq. 4, we propose the following defini-
tion for the net-ability of a power transmission grid:
A =
1
NGND

iG

jD
Cij 
kHij
pij
k 1
dij
k , 5
where G and D are the sets of generator and load nodes,
respectively, while Hij is the set of paths from generator i to
load j; likewise NG and ND are the total numbers of genera-
tors and loads, respectively. Finally, pij
k is the power share of
path k in transmitting power from i to j.
Let us stress that the definition of distance given in Eq.
4 is referred to a specific path. There is not the concept of
geodesic distance or shortest path here, in principle all the
paths are to be taken into account separately.
Let us call Zij the equivalent impedance of the circuit
whose ends are node i and node j; Uij is the voltage between
i and j and Ii is the current injected at node i and extracted at
node j Ii=−Ij. As shown in Fig. 1 the equivalent impedance
is defined as
Zij =
Uij
Ii
.
Furthermore, let Ii=1, Ij =−1, and Ih=0∀h i , j meaning
that a unit current is injected at node i and extracted at j,
while no current is extracted nor injected in other nodes,
then the computation of equivalent impedance is sketched in
Fig. 1 and amounts to
Zij =
Uij
Ii
= Uij ⇒ Zij = Ui − Uj
= zii − zij − zij − zjj
= zii − 2zij + zjj , 6
where zij is the ith, jth element of the impedance matrix, see
the Appendix.
In the following, electrical networks are analyzed using
a dc model. For a discussion of the reasons to choose a dc
rather than an ac model, see the Appendix. In a dc power
flow model the distance dij
k defined in Eq. 4 is equal to the
variation of the voltage angle between nodes i and j, when 1
unit of active power is injected at i and collected at j. Since
in the dc power flow model the variation of voltage angle is
considered as the equivalent dc voltage and the active power
is considered as the current, dij
k for any involved path be-
tween i and j is equal to the equivalent impedance of the
circuit whose ends are i and j,
dij
k
= Zij ∀ k . 7
Again, the expression of the distance between i and j given
in Eq. 7 is not related to a specific path, since it takes into
account all the existing paths between i and j.
Substituting Eq. 7 into Eq. 5 and keeping in mind that

kHij
pij
k
= 1,
we obtain
A =
1
NGND

iG

jD
Cij
Zij
. 8
In analogy with the expression of the vulnerability given
by Eq. 2, we define the vulnerability of line l as the net-
ability drop caused by an outage cut of the line l,
VAl =
A − Al
A
. 9
IV. CASE STUDY
In this section we use the two definitions, given by Eqs.
2 and 9, to estimate the line vulnerability of IEEE sample
networks,51 made of 30 and 57 nodes. For each case, the
results obtained from efficiency and net-ability are compared
with the overload rate, defined in the following.52 The over-
load in an electrical network is given by
P = 
lL
Pl
Pl
lim , 10
where Pl is the power flow through line l calculated by the dc
load flow model see the Appendix, Pl
lim is the flow limit of
line l and the sum is taken over the set L of lines in the
network. We are interested in the sensitivity of P to line
outages. Therefore, we call Pl the real power performance
parameter of the network upon cutting line l. The overload
rate is then defined as
Wl =
Pl − P
P
. 11
In Fig. 2, we have plotted the vulnerability VE Eq. 2,
the vulnerability VA Eq. 9 and the overload rate Eq. 11
versus line removal for the IEEE test cases with 30 and 57
nodes, respectively. A few comments on the overload rate are
appropriate. As we have shown, the overload rate is obtained
jj
j
j
i
i
j
UZ
I
I
I
I
i
I
i
j
=1
=−1
=1
=−1
=1
I =−1
U j
i
j
i
j
ij U iij zii −zij zij −z
FIG. 1. The computation scheme of
equivalent impedance.
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by computing the power flow through each line of the net-
work in the dc approximation. For a given network, the value
of the dc power flow through each line is a nonlinear func-
tion of power injections withdraws at the generators
loads. On the other hand, those values are not taken into
account in the definitions of efficiency and net-ability. Fur-
thermore, in the IEEE test cases, several generators produce
pure reactive power, namely they are assigned a real power
output equal to zero. On one side this means that these are
not treated as generators in a dc flow model; on the other
side these nodes are considered as generators both by the
efficiency and net-ability algorithms. In order to overcome
this limit, we have chosen to assign arbitrary values of active
power output to the generators which are purely reactive. In
Table I, we explicitly show these changes: in particular we
keep the IEEE numeration for the generators, Pg indicates
the IEEE real power output, while Pg indicates the real
power output assigned here.
In conclusion, one cannot expect a complete match be-
tween the results based on efficiency or net-ability and those
based on the dc power flow. However, it appears from Fig. 2
that in each of the sample cases under consideration the
methods based on net-ability and overload rate computation
can show evidence of a few highly critical lines; on the con-
trary, the plots obtained by the efficiency method are much
smoother, without any sharp peak. In order to quantify this
difference, in Table II we report the variances 2 of the
curves plotted in Fig. 2. Moreover, the correlation coeffi-
cients  between efficiency/overload, net-ability/overload,
and overload/overload are reported. We observe that the vari-
ances of the net-ability and overload curves are of the same
order of magnitude, while those obtained from the efficiency
curve are about one order of magnitude smaller. Likewise the
correlation coefficients between net-ability/overload are sig-
nificantly larger than those between efficiency/overload.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a new network metric called net-ability is
proposed, to evaluate the global performance of electric
power grids. Our aim was to estimate the impact of line
outages on the network performance in order to identify the
most critical lines. In this respect we have analyzed sample
networks taken from the IEEE database.51 For each system,
three different methods to evaluate the impact of line outages
have been used: 1 the method based on efficiency; 2 the
new method based on net-ability; 3 the computation of line
overloads by dc power flow. Since the latter is the approach
which takes into account the specific details of power grids,
it can be considered as the reference method. From this point
of view, the net-ability is capable of identifying some of the
most critical lines. However, we stress how the line over-
loads depend nonlinearly upon the values of power
injections/withdraws at the nodes. In real power networks
such values are not constant, as the demand and production
of electrical power vary considerably in time, for instance,
depending on the period of the year and the hours of the day.
On the other hand, both the efficiency and the net-ability
approach are based essentially on the topological features of
the network and do not take into account the actual values of
power injections and withdraws.
In order to check the validity of these topological ap-
proaches for real networks, one should compare their results
with those obtained from overload computation, after per-
forming a sort of time integration of the latter. At present,
such kind of time integration looks difficult to be imple-
mented in an algorithm. However, it is actually performed by
direct observation by those companies which are in charge of
the management and control of power grids in each country
(a)
(b)
FIG. 2. Color online Vulnerabilities and overload rate vs line removal for
a 30 node, 41 lines IEEE test case above; for a 57 node, 78 lines IEEE test
case below.
TABLE I. Real power conversion for the IEEE 30- and 57-node generators.
Case 30 Pg Pg Case 57 Pg Pg
Node 1 260.2 260.2 Node 1 128.9 128.9
Node 2 40 40 Node 2 0 120
Node 5 0 210 Node 3 40 40
Node 8 0 130 Node 6 0 55
Node 11 0 95 Node 8 450 450
Node 13 0 78 Node 9 0 230
Node 12 310 310
TABLE II. Variances 2 of the curves of efficiency drop, net-ability drop,
and overload rate; correlation coefficients  between efficiency/overload,
net-ability/overload, and overload/overload for the IEEE 30- and 57-nodes
test cases plotted in Fig. 2.
Efficiency Net-ability Overload
2 30 1.94 30.55 24.05
2 57 0.81 10.42 17.17
 30 0.08 0.43 1
 57 0.13 0.76 1
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and therefore have monitored each country network for
years. We have investigated the data of the Italian power grid
from Terna-Rete Elettrica Nazionale S.p.A.53 in terms of net-
ability, in order to find the most critical lines in the network.
Although explicit results are confidential for obvious security
reasons, we can say that a good match has been found be-
tween the results obtained by the net-ability algorithm and
the experimental measurements collected by Terna.
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APPENDIX: LINEARIZED POWER SYSTEMS MODELS
Here we provide a brief review of the main issues and
tools of power system analysis used in this work; for a com-
prehensive treatment we refer to Ref. 54.
A power transmission system can be schematically rep-
resented as a grid whose lines are electrical transmission
lines, while nodes are the points where electrical power can
be injected, withdrawn or redistributed. Accordingly, in a
power grid one can distinguish three types of nodes: genera-
tion nodes generators or power plants, load nodes consum-
ers, and transmission nodes. Each line in a power network
has its own maximum power flow capability, which is the
maximum amount of power flow that the line can sustain.
Power transmission systems operate in a sinusoidal
steady state. For a circuit made of N+1 buses operating in
the ac regime the nodal equations are written as

I1
I2
]
IN
 =
Y11 Y12 ¯ Y1N
Y21 Y22 ¯ Y2N
] ]  ]
YN1 YN2 ¯ YNN

U1
U2
]
UN
 , A1
where
Ii = Iieı Yij = yijeıij Ui = Uieıi
are complex quantities. In matrix notation Eq. A1 writes
I = YU , A2
where I is the vector of current sources, Y is the line admit-
tance matrix, and U is the vector of node voltages. Node 0 is
selected as the reference node ground, and node voltages
Ui are defined with respect to node 0. The elements of the
matrix Y are formed as follows:
• diagonal elements Yii: sum of the admittances of the lines
connected to node i;
• off-diagonal elements Yij: minus the sum of the admit-
tances of the lines connecting nodes i and j.
The complex power Si flowing through a node i is de-
fined as the product of the voltage Ui and the complex con-
jugate of the current Ii,
Si = UiIi* = Ui
k=1
N
Uk*Yki* = Pi + ıQi; A3
P and Q are called real and reactive power, respectively; see
Ref. 54 for a thorough explanation.
Since the quantities involved in an ac system show a
sinusoidal behavior, solving a full ac power flow model
means that one has to solve a system of nonlinear equations,
which is widely known to be a formidable task. The most
common method to reduce the power flow problem to a set
of linear equations is called the dc power flow.
The dc power flow approach is based on a number of
approximations:
• reactive power balance equations are ignored;
• line losses are ignored, that is, the resistance of each line is
set to zero, so only the reactance imaginary part of the
impedance is considered: yii=yij =yjj =1 /xij xij is the re-
actance of the line connecting i to j, ii= j j =− /2 and
ij = /2;
• all voltage magnitudes are identically set to one per unit,
Ui=1∀ i;
• all voltage angles are assumed to be small, i→0∀ i.
Under these approximations, the power flow through line l,
connecting nodes i and j, is given by
f l = Pi = − Pj =
UiUj sini −  j
xij
=
i −  j
xij
. A4
In a general circuit made of N nodes and L lines, where
P¯ is the vector of real power injections, ¯ is the vector of
phase angles and f¯ is the vector of power flows we have
Pi = 
l:i→∀j
f l = 
j=1
N
i −  j
xij
, A5
P¯ = B¯ , A6
where B is the NN admittance matrix,
Bij = −
1
xij
for i  j, Bii = 
ji
1
xij
.
In terms of the vector of power flows we have
f¯ = H¯ , A7
where H is the LN transmission matrix,
Hli = − Hlj =
1
xij
, Hlk = 0 ∀ k  i, j .
The admittance matrix B is singular since the sum of the
elements of each row is equal to zero, i=1
N Bij =0∀ j. This
means that the total injection power is equal to zero,

i=1
N
Pi = 0 ⇒ Pi = − 
ji
Pj .
To avoid this redundancy, a slack node, for instance, node N,
is chosen and set N=0. Thus one can eliminate the corre-
sponding terms in power vectors and matrices without losing
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information. In this spirit, B and H are submatrices, ob-
tained, respectively, from B and H by deleting the row and
column only the column in case of H corresponding to the
slack node N, while ¯ and P¯  are, respectively, the vector of
phase angles and vector of node power injections without the
slack node N.
The matrix B can be inverted and thus one can rewrite
Eqs. A6 and A7 in terms of the modified vectors and
matrices as
¯ = B−1P¯ , A8
f¯ = HB−1P¯  = AP¯ . A9
The power transmission distribution factors PTDF of the
circuit are the entries of the matrix A in Eq. A9.
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